55 research outputs found
Cryptographic Treatment of CryptDB's Adjustable Join
In this document, we provide a cryptographic treatment of the adjustable join protocol from CryptDB. We also discuss how our scheme could be used outside of CryptDB because it provides a simple functionality that may be needed in other settings. Intuitively, it is a pseudorandom permutation where an external party not knowing the secret key can nonetheless adjust a ciphertext under one key to a ciphertext under a different key, given an adjustment token from a party that knows the secret key
Remote Oblivious Storage: Making Oblivious RAM Practical
Remote storage of data has become an increasingly attractive and advantageous option, especially due to cloud systems. While encryption protects the data, it does not hide the access pattern to the data. A natural solution is to access remote storage using an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) which provably hides all access patterns. While ORAM is asymptotically efficient, the best existing scheme (Pinkas and Reinman, Crypto'10) still has considerable overhead for a practical implementation: for M stored items, it stores 4 times and sometimes 6 times more items remotely, requires O(log2 M) round trips to storage server per request, and periodically blocks all data requests to shuffle all storage (which is a lengthy process). In this paper, we first define a related notion to ORAM, oblivious storage (OS), which captures more accurately and naturally the security setting of remote storage. Then, we propose a new ORAM/OS construction that solves the practicality issues just outlined: it has a storage constant of ~ 1, achieves O(1) round trips to the storage server per request, and allows requests to happen concurrently with shuffle without jeopardizing security. Our construction consists of a new organization of server memory into a flat main part and a hierarchical shelter, a client-side index for rapidly locating identifiers at the server, a new shelter serving requests concurrent with the shuffle, and a data structure for locating items efficiently in a partially shuffled storage
CryptDB: A Practical Encrypted Relational DBMS
CryptDB is a DBMS that provides provable and practical privacy in the face of a compromised database server or curious database administrators. CryptDB works by executing SQL queries over encrypted data. At its core are three novel ideas: an SQL-aware encryption strategy that maps SQL operations to encryption schemes, adjustable query-based encryption which allows CryptDB to adjust the encryption level of each data item based on user queries, and onion encryption to efficiently change data encryption levels. CryptDB only empowers the server to execute queries that the users requested, and achieves maximum privacy given the mix of queries issued by the users. The database server fully evaluates queries on encrypted data and sends the result back to the client for final decryption; client machines do not perform any query processing and client-side applications run unchanged. Our evaluation shows that CryptDB has modest overhead: on the TPC-C benchmark on Postgres, CryptDB reduces throughput by 27% compared to regular Postgres. Importantly, CryptDB does not change the innards of existing DBMSs: we realized the implementation of CryptDB using client-side query rewriting/encrypting, user-defined functions, and server-side tables for public key information. As such, CryptDB is portable; porting CryptDB to MySQL required changing 86 lines of code, mostly at the connectivity layer
Metal: A Metadata-Hiding File-Sharing System
File-sharing systems like Dropbox offer insufficient privacy because a compromised server can see the file contents in the clear. Although encryption can hide such contents from the servers, metadata leakage remains significant. The goal of our work is to develop a file-sharing system that hides metadata---including user identities and file access patterns.
Metal is the first file-sharing system that hides such metadata from malicious users and that has a latency of only a few seconds. The core of Metal consists of a new two-server multi-user oblivious RAM (ORAM) scheme, which is secure against malicious users, a metadata-hiding access control protocol, and a capability sharing protocol.
Compared with the state-of-the-art malicious-user file-sharing scheme PIR-MCORAM (Maffei et al.\u2717), which does not hide user identities, Metal hides the user identities and is 500x faster (in terms of amortized latency) or 10^5x faster (in terms of worst-case latency)
MAGE: Nearly Zero-Cost Virtual Memory for Secure Computation
Secure Computation (SC) is a family of cryptographic primitives for computing
on encrypted data in single-party and multi-party settings. SC is being
increasingly adopted by industry for a variety of applications. A significant
obstacle to using SC for practical applications is the memory overhead of the
underlying cryptography. We develop MAGE, an execution engine for SC that
efficiently runs SC computations that do not fit in memory. We observe that,
due to their intended security guarantees, SC schemes are inherently oblivious
-- their memory access patterns are independent of the input data. Using this
property, MAGE calculates the memory access pattern ahead of time and uses it
to produce a memory management plan. This formulation of memory management,
which we call memory programming, is a generalization of paging that allows
MAGE to provide a highly efficient virtual memory abstraction for SC. MAGE
outperforms the OS virtual memory system by up to an order of magnitude, and in
many cases, runs SC computations that do not fit in memory at nearly the same
speed as if the underlying machines had unbounded physical memory to fit the
entire computation.Comment: 19 pages; Accepted to OSDI 202
Practical Volume-Based Attacks on Encrypted Databases
Recent years have seen an increased interest towards strong security
primitives for encrypted databases (such as oblivious protocols), that hide the
access patterns of query execution, and reveal only the volume of results.
However, recent work has shown that even volume leakage can enable the
reconstruction of entire columns in the database. Yet, existing attacks rely on
a set of assumptions that are unrealistic in practice: for example, they (i)
require a large number of queries to be issued by the user, or (ii) assume
certain distributions on the queries or underlying data (e.g., that the queries
are distributed uniformly at random, or that the database does not contain
missing values).
In this work, we present new attacks for recovering the content of individual
user queries, assuming no leakage from the system except the number of results
and avoiding the limiting assumptions above. Unlike prior attacks, our attacks
require only a single query to be issued by the user for recovering the
keyword. Furthermore, our attacks make no assumptions about the distribution of
issued queries or the underlying data. Instead, our key insight is to exploit
the behavior of real-world applications.
We start by surveying 11 applications to identify two key characteristics
that can be exploited by attackers: (i) file injection, and (ii) automatic
query replay. We present attacks that leverage these two properties in concert
with volume leakage, independent of the details of any encrypted database
system. Subsequently, we perform an attack on the real Gmail web client by
simulating a server-side adversary. Our attack on Gmail completes within a
matter of minutes, demonstrating the feasibility of our techniques. We also
present three ancillary attacks for situations when certain mitigation
strategies are employed.Comment: IEEE EuroS&P 202
CryptDB: Protecting confidentiality with encrypted query processing
Online applications are vulnerable to theft of sensitive information because adversaries can exploit software bugs to gain access to private data, and because curious or malicious administrators may capture and leak data. CryptDB is a system that provides practical and provable confidentiality in the face of these attacks for applications backed by SQL databases. It works by executing SQL queries over encrypted data using a collection of efficient SQL-aware encryption schemes. CryptDB can also chain encryption keys to user passwords, so that a data item can be decrypted only by using the password of one of the users with access to that data. As a result, a database administrator never gets access to decrypted data, and even if all servers are compromised, an adversary cannot decrypt the data of any user who is not logged in. An analysis of a trace of 126 million SQL queries from a production MySQL server shows that CryptDB can support operations over encrypted data for 99.5% of the 128,840 columns seen in the trace. Our evaluation shows that CryptDB has low overhead, reducing throughput by 14.5% for phpBB, a web forum application, and by 26% for queries from TPC-C, compared to unmodified MySQL. Chaining encryption keys to user passwords requires 11--13 unique schema annotations to secure more than 20 sensitive fields and 2--7 lines of source code changes for three multi-user web applications.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CNS-0716273)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (IIS-1065219
Privacy and accountability for location-based aggregate statistics
A significant and growing class of location-based mobile applications aggregate position data from individual devices at a server and compute aggregate statistics over these position streams. Because these devices can be linked to the movement of individuals, there is significant danger that the aggregate computation will violate the location privacy of individuals. This paper develops and evaluates PrivStats, a system for computing aggregate statistics over location data that simultaneously achieves two properties: first, provable guarantees on location privacy even in the face of any side information about users known to the server, and second, privacy-preserving accountability (i.e., protection against abusive clients uploading large amounts of spurious data). PrivStats achieves these properties using a new protocol for uploading and aggregating data anonymously as well as an efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol we developed from scratch for accountability. We implemented our system on Nexus One smartphones and commodity servers. Our experimental results demonstrate that PrivStats is a practical system: computing a common aggregate (e.g., count) over the data of 10,000 clients takes less than 0.46 s at the server and the protocol has modest latency (0.6 s) to upload data from a Nexus phone. We also validated our protocols on real driver traces from the CarTel project.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant 0931550)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant 0716273
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